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MEDICALLY NECESSITATED MEAL AND LODGING
COSTS: SHOULD THEY BE DEDUCTIBLE UNDER
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 213?
J. TImOTH PHILiPPs*
KENNETH B. TnMLou**
Look to your health; and if you have it, praise God, and value
it next to a good conscience; for health is the second blessing that
we mortals are capable of; a blessing that money cannot buy.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose that in the early spring of 1983 four taxpayers found themselves
in New Mexico. 2 Three of the four-A, B, and C-flew to Albuquerque from
Roanoke, Virginia. A, a salesman, was in town on business. B, a tax pro-
fessor at a Virginia law school, attended a seminar on recent tax legislation.
C, a businesswoman suffering from cancer, was sent to receive an innovative
sound treatment available only to outpatients of the Galen Institute in
Albuquerque.3 The fourth taxpayer, D, also afflicted with cancer and a resi-
dent of an Albuquerque suburb, was driven by his wife from his residence
to Albuquerque for the same sonic therapy. A and B stayed in the finest hotel
in town, C stayed at a rather spartan establishment near the Institute, and
D stayed at home.
* Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University; B.S. 1962, Wheeling College; J.D.
1965, Georgetown University; LL.M. 1966, Harvard University.
** Associate, Willcox, Savage, Hollis & Eley, Norfolk, Virginia; B.S. 1979, Canisius Col-
lege; J.D. 1982, Washington and Lee University.
This article was supported by a research grant from the Frances Lewis Law Center. The
authors wish to thank Peter Mallory, a third-year student at Washington and Lee Law School,
who contributed substantially to the completion of this article.
***As this article goes to press H.R. 4170 discussed infra at text accompanying notes 159-163
has passed the House of Representatives with its provision for partial deduction of medical lodg-
ing expenses intact. 130 CONG. REc. H 2741 (April 11, 1984).
H.R. 4170 remains to be reconciled with a Senate-passed tax and deficit reduction bill, S.
2062, The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, which does not contain a similar medical lodging deduction
provision.
1. I. WALTON, THE CoMPLEAT ANGLER (Epistle to the Reader) (Part I, Ch. 21) 1653-55.
2. The taxpayers in the example and their expenses are an amalgam of real and imagined
persons and transactions. The example is presented to demonstrate the application of the medical
expense deduction of § 213 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Of course, an abundance
of factual situations and variations is conceivable, even likely. Cf. Frankfurter, Some Reflections
on the Reading of Statutes, 47 CoLu.. L. REv. 527, 528 (1947) ("The imagination which can
draw an income tax statute to cover the myriad transactions of a society like ours, capable of
producing the necessary revenue without producing a flood of litigation, has not yet revealed
itself.").
3. To eliminate the possibility that C might have foregone a similar treatment locally
available, we assume that the Albuquerque facility is the sole provider of the sound therapy.
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A and B attended the final game of the national collegiate basketball
playoffs-A with his clients after finishing his business dealings, B with several
former colleagues. Unfortunately, A, a Wahoo,4 suffered what subsequently
was diagnosed as a minor heart attack when North Carolina State won the
championship. After spending a week in the hospital, A was asked to leave
so that the hospital could accommodate fans of the University of Houston
(the team defeated by North Carolina State in the championship game).
Although sufficiently strong to return to his hotel, A was still too weak to
fly back to Roanoke. Thus, A's wife flew to Albuquerque on the specific ad-
vice of A's physician and A moved back to his hotel room where he was at-
tended by his wife. C and D did not see the game; both were recovering from
the effects of their sound treatments-C in her hotel room, D at his house.
Apart from the cost of socializing and the travel expenses of A's wife, the
three Roanoke taxpayers incurred similar expenses for food, lodging and
transportation.
Our four taxpayers prepare their returns for 1983. What amounts will
the Internal Revenue Code (Code) allow them to deduct?
Looking first at D, the Albuquerque resident, we expect that the amounts
paid for the cancer treatment and for driving to the Galen Institute are deduc-
tible medical expenses under section 213 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.1
We find that is the case. Then, using the maxim that personal living costs
should not be met by tax-free dollars,6 we conclude that D cannot deduct
his expenses for food, mortgage principal, and the like while he was at home
recovering from the cancer treatment. Again, that is correct. What about the
three Roanoke taxpayers? Clearly, A and C were in need of some medical
attention and incurred expenses to secure necessary medical care. We might,
therefore, conclude that both should be able to take advantage of section 213
and deduct the living expenses they incurred in the course of obtaining that
treatment. But we would be wrong. A, under section 213, can deduct all or
nearly all of the inpatient living expenses and hotel and meal costs incurred
during the Albuquerque trip after his heart attack. C cannot deduct the cost
of her outpatient meals and lodging at all.' Yet, we cannot tell whether C
4. "Wahoo" refers to a student or alumnus of the University of Virginia, especially one
who is a staunch supporter of its athletic teams. The 1982-83 Virginia basketball team failed
to advance to the final rounds of the collegiate playoffs, losing to North Carolina State in the
NCAA Regional playoffs.
5. I.R.C. § 213 (West 1983). See infra text accompanying notes 12-43 (history of medical
expense deduction and description of deduction's operation).
6. The ban on deducting personal living costs is included in the Internal Revenue Code
as § 262: "Except as otherwise expressly provided ... no deduction shall be allowed for personal,
living, or family expenses." This is not to suggest that taxpayers have not tried to deduct their
personal living costs as medical expenses. See infra text accompanying notes 39-43; see, e.g.,
Jefferson v. United States, 32 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) 6053, 6054-55 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (taxpayer sought
to deduct as home medical treatment, laundry cost, bath oil, skin oil, shampoo, gas and electri-
city costs, and pro-rated portion of rent and utilities). But see Bye v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M.
(P-H) 72,057 at 252 (1972) (domestic services rendered by niece to ill household member com-
parable to those performed in hospital).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 59-87.
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was any less "sick" than was A. Nor can we say with certainty that she en-
joyed her visit to Albuquerque more than A did. As for tax professor B, who
had a fun-filled time in Albuquerque, most likely he can deduct all of his
living costs as business expenses!
What principles, if any, justify this divergent tax treatment of A, B, C
and D's similar expenses? Do reasons exist, either "inside" or "outside" the
nature of a personal income tax, 9 that would require a distinction between
the status accorded to the living expenses of outpatient taxpayers C and D,
inpatient taxpayer A, and tax professor B, who incurred no medical expense
and had a great time in Albuquerque?
This article examines these and other questions concerning the extent to
which taxpayers may deduct living costs incurred in obtaining medical care.
As this article will discuss, away-from-home living expenses incurred in con-
nection with obtaining outpatient medical care generally are not deductible,
while inpatient living expenses are deductible. 0 This article will attempt to
demonstrate that the purported abuse that gave rise to the current rule of
nondeductibility of outpatient, medically related travel expenses-vacations
under the guise of medical necessity-was exaggerated. Moreover, the
mechanism selected to prevent the abuse was so overbroad in its effect that
the desired curbing of "medical vacations" also has resulted in the nondeduc-
tibility of nonabusive expenses paid by taxpayers who must receive medical
attention away from home. In this article we further argue that the nondeduc-
tibility of away-from-home outpatient living expenses cannot be reconciled
with the deductibility of purely elective cosmetic medical treatments or the
liberal tax treatment granted for living expenses in the business travel context,
and that the nondeductibility of medically-related outpatient travel expenses
is inconsistent with national concern about the rising costs of medical care."
Finally, this article addresses several recent proposals to amend section 213
so as to restore partial or comprehensive deductibility for medically necessary
travel expenses.
II. OvERVIEw OF THE MEDICAL EXPENSE DEDUCTION
Section 213(a), as amended, expressly grants a limited deduction from
gross income for expenses paid during the taxable year for medical care of
the taxpayer, his spouse and dependents.' The congressional intent underly-
ing this deduction, however, is somewhat unclear. The legislative history of
the 1954 Code provides little in the way of guidance and the sparse pro-
nouncements concerning the predecessor to section 213, section 23(x) of the
1939 Internal Revenue Code,'3 are cryptic at best. For instance, the Senate
Finance Committee Report dealing with section 23(x) merely states:
8. See I.R.C. § 162(a)(2) (West 1983).
9. See Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARv. L. REv. 309,
314 (1972) (discussion of "inside" and "outside" reasons for Code distinctions).
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. I.R.C. § 213(a) (West 1983).
13. Section 23(x) was added to the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 by § 127(a) of the Revenue
19841
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This allowance is recommended in consideration of the heavy tax
burden that must be borne by individuals during the existing emergency
[World War III and of the desirability of maintaining the present high
leN'el of public health and morale.
14
Although not articulated in this passage, the basis for Congress' grant
of the deduction well may have been the view that medical care costs, if ex-
traordinary, go beyond mere personal expenses and must be taken into ac-
count to measure accurately a citizen's ability to pay taxes, that is, his in-
come. Indeed, Randolph Paul, speaking on behalf of the Treasury Depart-
ment in the House hearings on section 23(x), advocated the adoption of an
extraordinary medical expense deduction for just such a reason."5 Unfortu-
nately, although the legislative histories of sections 213 and 23(x) contain recur-
ring references to "extraordinary" medical expenses, 16 the legislative histories
do not indicate, clearly whether Congress viewed such expenses as affecting
the ability to pay taxes or whether Congress instead merely sought to sub-
sidize such expenses as an act of legislative benevolence. Later expressions
of legislative intent, however, more clearly indicate an ability-to-pay rationale. 
7
Whatever Congress' purpose was, the existence of the medical expense
deduction has engendered an ongoing debate regarding the deduction's pro-
priety from a tax policy standpoint. 8 The controversy over the deductibility
of medical expenses is set within a larger theoretical effort to define the pro-
Act of 1942, Pub. L. 77-753, 56 Stat. 825 (1942). It provided in pertinent part that:
[In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions].., expenses paid
during the taxable year, not compensated for by insurance or otherwise, for medical
care of the taxpayer, his spouse, or a dependent ... of the taxpayer. The term "medical
care," as used in this subsection, shall include amounts paid for the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any
structure or function of the body (including amounts paid for accident or health
insurance).
14. S. REP. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1942).
15. Revenue Revisions of 1942: Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways and Means,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1612-13 (1942). The assumption underlying Paul's rationale was that all
taxpayers incur a "normal" or "ordinary" amount of medical expenditures properly classifiable
as personal consumption. Newman, The Medical Expense Deduction: A Preliminary Postmortem,
53 So. CAL. L. REv. 787, 789-90 (1980); Note, Medical Expense Deductions Under Section 213
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954: The Definition of "Medical Care," 7 GOLDEN GATE L.
REv. 535 (1977).
16. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4025, 4055.
17. See S. REp. No. 494, Vol. I, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 113 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 781, 881 ("The primary rationale for allowing an itemized deduction
for medical expenses is that 'extraordinary' medical costs ... reflect an economic hardship, beyond
the individual's control which reduces the ability to pay Federal income tax.").
18. This controversy has arisen despite the fact that the dollars involved pale in comparison
to other tax preference provisions. Examination of estimated revenue effects of various items
using the tax expenditure concept shows the following estimated revenue cost of the medical ex-
pense deduction:
[Vol. 41:453
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per base for personal income taxes.1 9 Both proponents and critics of the deduc-
tion have used the well-known Haig-Simons formulation-that personal in-
come equals personal consumption plus wealth accumulation 2°-as an analytical
template. Proponents have defended the deduction as necessary for a proper
measurement of income under the Haig-Simons definition. Some, however,
have criticized the deduction as an unwarranted reduction in an individual's
tax base for what is essentially personal consumption.2 Opponents further
have contended that, owing to the progressive nature of the individual income
tax rates, the deduction is in effect an upside-down subsidy providing a greater
amount of tax savings per dollar of deduction for individuals with higher in-
comes than for those with lower incomes.
22
Since expenditures for medical treatment do not fall within the accumula-
tion component of the Hag-Simons' equation,23 deductibility by definition
Fiscal Year 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Dollars
(Millions) 3,105 2,630 3,070 3,370 3,740 4,165
By comparison, the estimates for two other deductions frequently claimed by taxpayers are:
Mortgage interest
on owner-
occupied homes 25,065 27,945 30,130 32,785 35,305 37,950
Charitable
contributions 8,285 8,250 9,670 12,235 11,010 10,210
JOINT COM1MITEE ON TAXATION STAFF, SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE & HOUSE UsE WAYS AND
MEANS COMMITTEE PAMPHLET ON EsmiMATEs OF FEDERAL TAx EXPENDITURES FOR FY 1983-1988
(Mar. 7, 1983) [hereinafter cited as STAFF EsTnmtATES].
19. See generally BITTKER, GALVIN, MUSrRAVE & PECmIAN, A COM1'RE ENSIVE INCOME
TAX BASE? A DEBATE (1968) [hereinafter cited as GALvIN]; 1 HousE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS,
86th CONG., 1St SESS. TAx REVISION COMPENDIUM (Comm. Print 1959) [hereinafter cited as TAx
COMPENDIUM]; Andrews, supra note 9, at 312-25; Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why
They Fit Poorly in an "Ideal" Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World,
31 Stan. L. Rev. 831 (1979).
20. See R.M. Haig, The Federal Income Tax 7 (1921), reprinted in Readings in the Economics
of Taxation 54 (R. Musgrave & C. Shoup eds. 1959); H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION
50-55 (1938). In Simons' formal presentation of the income concept, personal income is defined
as: "[T]he algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the
change in the value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period
in question." SIMONS, supra, at 50. The form "income equals personal consumption and ac-
cumulation" is a frequently used abbreviation. See Bittker, Income Tax Deductions, Credits,
and Subsidies For Personal Expenditures, 16 J. L. & ECON. 193, 195-206 (1973) (brief history
and explanation of Haig-Simons definition).
21. See Kelman, supra note 19, at 865-74.
22. See, e.g., Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy:
A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. REV. 705, 721-22 (1970).
23. That is, unless one is prepared to argue for inclusion of medical expenses in the Haig-
Simons formula as additions to "human capital value." Cf. I.R.C. § 104; Internal Revenue Code
of 1939 § 22(b)(5); H. REP. No. 767, 65th CONG., 2d SEss. 29-30 (1918), reprinted in 1939-1
C.B. [Part II] 85, 97; 31 Op. A=T. GEN. 304 (1918) ("The proceeds of the [insurance policy]
... take the place of capital in human ability which was destroyed by the accident.") (opinion
19841
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must turn on whether away-from-home outpatient expenses represent personal
consumption. 4 If these expenses are personal consumption costs, the criticisms
are valid. If the expenses do not constitute personal consumption expenses,
then a deduction for them is not only justifiable, but is actually essential to
a proper measurement of income.
Some currently deductible section 213 expenditures, such as those for purely
cosmetic elective surgery, 25 seemingly constitute personal consumption costs.
Conversely, many commentators have concluded that medically essential, ex-
traordinary expenditures made to put a taxpayer in a position to engage in
normal personal consumption and income production do not constitute per-
sonal consumption themselves. 21 Instead, such expenses arguably reduce a tax-
payer's current ability to pay taxes in much the same way that expenditures
to repair a business asset reduce the current income generated by that asset.
2 1
Moreover, extraordinary medical expenditures lack the characteristics usually
associated with personal consumption outlays. By definition, extraordinary
medical expenses are rarely incurred, and usually do not involve the expres-
sion of consumer preferences and tastes as one normally envisions those con-
cepts. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, their incidence places in-
dividuals involuntarily in a different position, vis-a-vis the ability to pay taxes,
than the position of those with otherwise equivalent earnings who do not have
such costs thrust upon them. 8
Rather than attempting to resolve conclusively the seemingly
unresolvable-whether medical expenses represent personal consumption
outlays for purposes of a fair tax system-we will assume, as many commen-
holding accident insurance proceeds not includible in gross income, delivered before passage in
1918 of statute expressly excluding such proceeds).
24. See Andrews, supra note 9, at 335-37; Kelman, supra note 19, at 859-64; infra text
accompanying notes 40-44.
25. See Rev. RuI. 82-111, 1982-1 C.B. 48.
26. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 9 at 335-43; Bittker, Income Tax Deductions, Credits,
and Subsidies for Personal Expenses, 16 J. LAw & EcoN. 193, 198-99 (1973); Jensen, Rationale
of the Medical Expense Deduction, 7 NAT'L J. TAX 274, 283-84 (1954). Similarly, payments received
by a taxpayer in the form of worker's compensation, certain health and accident insurance distribu-
tions, and personal injury damage awards do not represent taxable income, perhaps partly because
they represent a replenishment of human capital. See supra note 23; I.R.C. § 104 (West 1983).
The existence of this provision presents an equitable argument for allowing a medical expense
deduction. Assume Taxpayer A incurs $100 of medical expense and pays for it with $100 of
health insurance proceeds excludible under I.R.C. § 104(a)(3). If uninsured Taxpayer B pays for
$100 of medical expense out of his own funds, unless B can deduct the expenditure, B is in a
disadvantaged position vis a vis A, B paying with taxable funds for the same expense A has
been able to pay with non-taxable funds.
27. See Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways
and Means, 83d. Cong., Ist Sess. 80 (1953) (statement of Representative Oliver P. Bolton).
28. Vertical equity requires that persons in unequal positions, with respect to their ability
to pay taxes, pay different amounts of tax, reflecting in a significant way the differences in their
positions. Horizontal equity mandates that persons in equal positions with respect to their ability
to pay tax should pay equal amounts of tax. See Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept,
81 HAiv. L. REv. 44, 45 (1967).
[Vol. 41:453
MEAL AND LODGING COSTS
tators have concluded, that medically necessary, extraordinary expenditures
reduce a taxpayer's funds available for personal consumption or savings and,
therefore, justifiably are deductible from the individual income tax base.
29
Unfortunately, section 213 and the law that has developed around it fail to
draw fully and effectively the critical distinction between essential medical
outlays and nonessential personal expenditures. From a policy standpoint, the
deduction provision is justifiable only to the extent that its application turns
on this dichotomy.
Before turning to the principal topic of this article-the nondeductibility
of away-from-home, outpatient living expenses- we ohtline briefly the general
requirements of section 213. These requirements to a large extent may be viewed
as limiting deductibility to the category of medically essential expenditures
that, from a policy standpoint, justifiably may be deducted. To qualify for
section 213 treatment, the expenses to be deducted must exceed a certain
minimum level 30 designed to insure their "extraordinary" nature. Moreover,
the expenses must have been incurred for "medical care." Section 213(d)(1)
defines "medical care" expenses as amounts paid: "(A) for the diagnosis,
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease or for the purpose of
affecting any structure or function of the body, (B) for transportation primarily
for and essential to medical care .... or (C) for insurance covering medical
care ... " 31
A major difficulty in administering the deduction has been defining pre-
cisely what comes within the term "medical care." The statutory definition
is so broad that nearly any expenditure that is beneficial to one's health con-
ceivably could be considered within the term. However, Congress clearly in-
dicated in the Finance Committee Report accompanying the 1942 Revenue
Act that it did not intend this broad reading.The Report stated that a deduc-
29. The Tax Expenditure Budget takes the contrary position that medically necessary ex-
traordinary expenditures are not justifiably deductible. The Tax Expenditure Budget includes the
medical deduction as an item of tax expenditure, indicating that medical deductions are not regarded
as justifiable, since the Budget purports to detail the costs to the Federal government of devia-
tions from a theoretically ideal income tax base. See STAF Es~mATEs, supra note 18. The literature
is, of course, replete with controversy over just what constitutes an ideal income tax base. See,
e.g., GAvIN, supra note 19.
30. Code § 213(a) restricts the measure of the medical deduction to the following amounts:
the expenses paid during the taxable year, not compensated for by insurance or other-
wise, for medical care of the taxpayer, his spouse, or a dependent (as defined in section
152), to the extent that such exp~enses exceed 5 percent of adjusted gross income. ...
I.R.C. § 213(a) (West 1983). Beginning in 1984, § 213(b) further limits the amount of the deduc-
tion by providing that the cost of medicine and drugs may be taken into account in the § 213(a)
calculation only to the extent that such drugs are prescription drugs or insulin. Id. at § 213(b).
The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, § 202(a), Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat.
324, 421 (1982) (TEFRA), raised the percentage amount from 3, the prior ceiling, to Y, on the
ground that approximately 5'of adjusted gross income (AGI) spent on medical care is closer
to "ordinary" in the present day context than is three percent. See S. REP. No. 494, supra note
17, at 113.
31. I.R.C. § 213(d)(1) (West 1983).
1984]
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tion was to be allowed only if the expenditure was made primarily in connec-
tion with a disease or defect.32 Even with this limitation the generally nebulous
character of the terms "health" and "disease," ' 3 3 and the wide variety of
"treatments" available have required a continuous process of line-drawing
32. Specifically, the Finance Committee Report accompanying the 1942 Revenue Act stated
that "[Ilt is not intended . . . that a deduction should be allowed for any expense that is not
incurred primarily for the prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental defect or illness."
S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1942). The present Treasury Regulations reflect this
intent in their provision that "[An expenditure which is merely beneficial to the general health
. . . is not an expenditure for medical care." Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (1982).
33. For typical lexicographic treatment of the terms "health" and "disease," see STaD-
MAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 403 (5th ed. 1982), which defines "disease" as:
1. Morbus; illness; sickness; an interruption, cessation, or disorder of body functions,
systems, or organs. 2. A disease entity characterized usually by at least two of these
criteria: a recognized etiologic agent (or agents), an identifiable group of signs and
symptoms, or consistent anatomical alterations.
The more frequent approach is tautological. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY
DICTIONARY 836, 525 (2d ed. 1976) ("health" defined as "freedom from defect, pain, or disease"
and "disease" defined as "any departure from health"). These circular definitions do seem to
have some basis in everyday experience. Anyone who has ever completed an employment applica-
tion by inserting "health - excellent" after, say, an appendectomy, can affirm this. ("I was in
pretty bad shape last week, but now I'm healthy again.") Cf. W. Manning, J. Newhouse &
J. Ware, The Status of Health in Demand Estimation; or, Beyond Excellent, Good, Fair, and
Poor, in ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF HEALTH 143 (Fuchs ed. 1982).
The mutual dependence of the terms "health" and "disease" has stimulated attempts at more
positive definition. The foremost example is from the World Health Organization: "Health is
a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease
or .infirmity." CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION Preamble (1958), quoted
in H. Engelhardt, The Concepts of Health and Disease in EVALUATION AND EXPLANATION IN THE
BIOMEDICAL SCIENCES 125 (1975). Under this definition one might question whether anyone is
healthy. See also R. DUBOS, MIRAGE OF HEALTH: UTOPIAN PROGRESS AND BIOLOGICAL CHANGE
26 (Harper Colophon ed. 1981) ("Health and happiness are the expression of the manner in
which the individual responds and adapts to the challenges that he meets in everyday life.");
I. ILLICH, MEDICAL NEMESIS 273 (1976) ("Health . . . designates the ability to adapt to changing
environments, to growing up and to aging, to healing when damaged, to suffering, and to the
peaceful expectation of death."). These efforts to give more substantial meaning to the term
"health" share an obvious defect-substitution of "well-being," "responds to challenges," "adapts
to environment" for the referent "disease."
Thus "health" and "disease" may carry both evaluative and normative meanings, yet serve
different purposes. See Engelhardt, supra, at 126, 139. A physician and professor of philosophy
of medicine expressed the idea in this way:
[H]ealth and disease are not symmetrical concepts, nor are they things, though
important confusions have arisen from conceiving of them as such. Rather, the con-
cept of disease is a mode of analyzing certain phenomena for the purposes of diagnosis,
prognosis, and therapy. The concept is in one respect pragmatic, and in many respects
influenced by issues of value. Particular diseases border on questions of moral and
political significance. And while there are many diseases, there is in a sense only one
health-a regulative ideal of autonomy directing the physician to the patient as person,
the sufferer of the illness, and the reason for all the concern and activity.
Id. at 139. See Feld, Abortion to Aging: Problems of Definition in the Medical Expense Tax
Deduction, 58 B.U.L. REv. 165 (1978) (general discussion of how problem handled by courts
and IRS).
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and evolution by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the courts. For ex-
ample, is "alcoholism" a disease and is the cost of transportation to meetings
of Alcoholics Anonymous an expense for "medical care"? The IRS has ruled
affirmatively on both of these questions. 4 The IRS originally took the posi-
tion that, because abortion was illegal, expenses of abortion were not
deductible. 3 The IRS has since changed its position36 following the United
States Supreme Court's decisions favorable to the practice of abortion . 3 Even
foreign policy may affect the boundaries of "medical care." Shortly after the
United States resumed relations with the People's Republic of China, the IRS
ruled that acupuncture constituted deductible medical care.
38
In addition to the requirement that the expense be for "medical care,"
the relationship between the "disease" and the "treatment" must be close
enough to warrant a deduction. Expressed differently, a sufficient causal con-
nection between the disease and the incurrence of the expense must exist for
the expense to be deductible. The difficulty in this area arises from the fact
that the "treatment" in many cases may involve substantial elements of per-
sonal consumption which theoretically should be obtained only with after-tax
income.3 9 For example, dancing lessons recommended by a physician to cor-
rect a person's curvature of the spine undoubtedly have a medical purpose,
but also contain a large element of personal consumption. The question then
becomes which element is prevalent, the medical or the personal? One case
disallowed a medical expense deduction for the cost of dance instruction under
circumstances similar to those just described by applying a "but for" test."0
Under this test the taxpayer must establish that the expenditure was necessary
to medical treatment and that the expenditure otherwise would not have been
made."' In the case of the dance lessons the court said the expenditure would
have been made regardless of medical necessity and therefore was not
34. See Rev. Rul. 63-273, 1963-2 C.B. 112. In addition to the cost of transportation to
Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, costs of meals and lodging incident to inpatient care at an
alcoholism treatment facility also qualify as expenditures for "medical care." Rev. Rul. 73-325,
1973-2 C.B. 75.
35. See Treas. Reg. 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (1957); Feld, supra note 33, at 169-70.
36. See Rev. Rul. 73-201, 1973-1 C.B. 140.
37. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); see also
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983); Planned Parent-
hood Assoc. v. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983); Simopoulous v. Virginia, 103 S. Ct. 2532 (1983).
38. Rev. Rul. 72-593, 1972-2 C.B. 180.
39. See I.R.C. § 262 (west 1983); Andrews, supra note 9, at 337; Newman, supra note
15, at 788-89.
40. Ende v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (P-H), 75,256 (1975); accord Thoene v. Commis-
sioner, 33 T.C. 62 (1959).
41. See Jacobs v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 813, 819 (1974); Feld, supra note 33, at 178.
In Jacobs, the taxpayer attempted to deduct legal fees incurred by him in obtaining a divorce.
The taxpayer had been advised by a psychiatrist that the divorce was necessary to alleviate the
taxpayer's clinical depression. The court denied the deduction on the ground that the taxpayer
would have obtained the divorce for personal reasons regardless of medical necessity. See Jacobs,
62 T.C. at 819.
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deductible.4 2 The problem bears obvious similarities to that of distinguishing
between ordinary and necessary business expenses and personal consumption
expenses under Code section 162, but there has been little if any discussion
of this analogy in the decided cases. 3
In sum, the extraordinary amount, "medical care," and "but for" re-
quirements constitute the primary mechanisms by which deductibility under
section 213 is limited to the class of expenses-medically-essential, extraor-
dinary expenditures-that sound tax policy dictates be treated as deductible.
Still, these requirements suffer from certain deficiencies. First, as interpreted
by the courts and the IRS, the limitations fail to filter out completely certain
personal consumption outlays, such as the cost of purely cosmetic, elective
surgery, the deduction of which is unsupportable from a tax policy stand-
point. A second drawback-upon which this article will now focus-is that
the "medical care" requirement, as presently construed, prevents the deduc-
tion of certain expenses, specifically outpatient, away-from-home living costs,
which in certain instances should be deductible.
III. Ti DEDUCTIBILITY UNDER SECTION 213 OF AWAY-FROM-HOME
LIVING EXPENSES
Although section 213(e) includes within "medical care" expenses certain
"transportation" costs, 4 the cost of meals and lodging for persons who are
away from home to obtain outpatient medical treatment generally is held to
be outside of the subsection's purview and, therefore, non-deductible." This
interpretation follows not so much from the statute's express language, but
42. Ende, 44 T.C.M. (P-H) at 1080.
43. The analogy between § 213 medical expenses and § 162 ordinary and necessary business
expenses has been discussed by several commentators. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 33, at 181;
Newman, supra note 15, at 802-03; Klein, The Deductibility of Transportation Expenses of a
Combination Business and Pleasure Trip-A Conceptual Analysis, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1099, 1101
(1966).
44. The Supreme Court has indicated in dictum that only the transportation costs of the
patient may qualify for a § 213 deduction. See Commissioner v. Bilder, 369 U.S. 499, 502 (1962).
Courts and the IRS, however, have permitted the deduction of transportation costs of family
members who accompanied the patient to provide him indispensible medical care. See, e.g., Oliver
v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 575, 578 (8th Cir. 1966) (parties stipulated that transportation ex-
penses of husband who accompanied ailing wife were deductible); Carasso v. Commissioner, 292
F.2d 367, 368 (2d Cir. 1961) (transportation expenses of patient and his spouse), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 874 (1962); Rose v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 521, 528 (1969) (transportation expenses
of patient and her mother), aff'd, 435 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 907 (1971);
Hunt v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (P-H) 72,226 (1972) (transportation costs of mother when
her presence was essential to treatment of son); see also Cohn v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 387,
390 (1962) (rejecting IRS determination that neither patient nor his spouse could deduct transpor-
tation costs). But see Kelly v. Commissioner, 440 F.2d 307, 308 n.2 (7th Cir. 1971) (discussed
infra text accompanying notes 64-68).
45. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Bilder, 369 U.S. 499, 501-05 (1962); Levine v. Commis-
sioner, 695 F.2d 57, 59 (2d Cir. 1982) (U.S. app. pending); Montgomery v. Commissioner, 428
F.2d 243, 244-45 (6th Cir. 1970); Oliver v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 575, 578-79 (8th Cir. 1966).
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rather from the legislative history describing the purpose behind its enactment.
Before addressing in greater detail the specific rules governing the deductibil-
ity under section 213 of away-from-home living expenses, a brief discussion
of the legislative purpose is in order.
As already indicated, prior to the enactment of the 1954 Code, the deduc-
tion of medical expenses was governed by section 23(x) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939.6 Section 23(x) expressly authorized deductions only for amounts
spent for medical care, which was defined as "diagnosis, cure, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of disease." The section was construed, however,
to include the cost of meals and lodging during travel primarily for and essen-
tial to medical treatment. 47 Because the concept of "travel" was interpreted
broadly, taxpayers could invoke the section 23(x) deduction for food and lodg-
ing costs paid both in getting to the place of medical treatment and at the
place of medical treatment. 4 As might be expected, this liberal reading of
section 23(x) led to some overreaching by taxpayers. Such overreaching typically
took the form of vacations disguised as medical necessities. 49 Taxpayers would
travel on their doctors' orders to resort areas in sunny climates, run up large
hotel bills, and attempt to deduct the entire cost of their "medication." For
example, in one case the taxpayer attempted to deduct the cost of travelling,
including meals and lodging, to resort hotels in New Jersey and Arizona two
years after his wife had suffered a coronary occlusion. The resorts were ones
he and his wife had visited in prior years. The Tax Court denied the deduction
on the ground that the "treatment" was too remote from the "disease."" 0
In 1954 Congress reacted to what it apparently perceived as misuse of
the medical expense deduction for what were essentially vacation costs and
the danger that such misuse ostensibly posed to the public fisc. Congress
46. See supra note 13.
47. See Commissioner v. Bilder, 369 U.S. 499, 501 (1962) (citing Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(x)-i;
I.T. 3786, 1946-1 C.B. 75; Stringham v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 580 (1949). aff'd, 183 F.2d 579
(6th Cir. 1950)).
48. Montgomery v. Commissioner, 428 F.2d 243, 244 (6th Cir. 1970); see Cohn v. Com-
missioner, 38 T.C. 387, 390-91 (1962).
49. See Kelly v. Commissioner, 440 F.2d 307, 308 (7th Cir. 1971); Montgomery v. Com-
missioner, 428 F.2d 243, 245 (6th Cir. 1970).
50. Havey v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 409 (1949). In denying the Havey taxpayer's deduc-
tion, the Tax Court listed several factors which have been quoted often jn subsequent cases:
In determining allowability, many factors must be considered. Consideration should
be accorded the motive or purpose of the taxpayer, but such factor is not alone deter-
minative. To accord it conclusive weight would make nugatory the prohibition against
allowing personal, living, or family expenses. Thus also it is important to inquire as
to the origin of the expense. Was it incurred at the direction or suggestion of a physi-
cian; did the treatment bear directly on the physical condition in question; did the
treatment bear such a direct or proximate therapeutic relation to the bodily condition
as to justify a reasonable belief the same would be efficacious; was the treatment so
proximate in time to the onset or recurrence of the disease or condition as to make
one the true occasion of the other, thus eliminating expense incurred for general, as
contrasted with some specific, physical improvement?
Id. at 412. See infra text accompanying notes 94-96.
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modified the language of the medical expense provision contained in the new
Code, 51 former section 213(e), by changing the definition of "medical care"
previously set out in section 23(x) to provide explicitly for the deductibility
of "transportation costs," 2 but not for the wider category of travel costs.5 3
In Bilder v. Commissioner," the Supreme Court read this amendment to imply
that Congress meant to exclude from deductible medical costs travel expenses
other than transportation costs, that is, outpatient, away-from-home living
costs." This interpretation was based on the statute's legislative history. The
House Committee Report dealing with section 213 stated: "A new definition
of 'medical expense' is provided which incorporates regulations under present
law and also provides for the deduction of transportation expenses for travel
prescribed for health, but not the ordinary living expenses incurred during
such a trip."5' 6 The Senate Committee Report contained similar language. 7
Moreover, both the House and Senate Reports on the 1954 Code stated:
The deduction permitted for "transportation primarily for and essen-
tial to medical care" clarifies existing law in that it specifically ex-
cludes deduction of any meals and lodging while away from home
receiving medical treatment. For example, if a doctor prescribes that
a patient must go to Florida in order to alleviate specific chronic
ailments and to escape unfavorable climatic conditions which have
proven injurious to the health of the taxpayer, and the travel is
prescribed for reasons other than the general improvement of a pa-
tient's health, the cost of the patient's transportation to Florida would
be deductible but not his living expenses while there. However, if a
doctor prescribed an appendectomy and the taxpayer chose to go to
Florida for the operation not even his transportation costs would be
deductible. The subsection is not intended otherwise to change the
existing definitions of medical care, to deny the cost of ordinary am-
bulance transportation nor to deny the cost of food or lodging pro-
vided as part of a hospital bill.
5 8
51. See Kelly v. Commissioner, 440 F.2d 307, 308, 310 (7th Cir. 1971); Montgomery v.
Commissioner, 428 F.2d 243, 245, 246 (6th Cir. 1976).
52. Act of Aug. 16, 1954, c.736, 68A Stat. 69 (former § 213(e) presently is codified at
I.R.C. § 213(d)).
53. While the § 213 distinction between "travel" expenses and "transportation" expenses
might seem somewhat unclear, the concept of "travel" is accorded a broader meaning under
the Code. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(a) (1982) (deductible travel expenses under § 162 in-
clude meals and lodging at the place traveled to as well as "travel fares," i.e., transportation costs).
54. 369 U.S. 499 (1962).
55. Id. at 501-03 (1962). See infra text accompanying notes 77-87.
56. H.R. Rap. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4017, 4055.
57. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4621, 4666.
58. See H.R. REP. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., A60 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE
CONG. &AD. NEWS 4017, 4197; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 219-20 (1954), reprinted
in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4621, 4856.
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Against this backdrop evolved the present case law and Treasury Regula-
tions concerning the deduction of away-from-home living expenses under sec-
tion 213. 59 In conformity with Congress' expressed intent, both the courts and
the applicable Treasury Regulations recognize the deductibility of inpatient
food and lodging costs. 60 If a person has living expenses at an establishment
other than a hospital, the picture becomes somewhat more complicated.
Treasury Regulation section 1.213-1(e)(1)(v) provides that a person staying in
a substitute "institution" primarily to receive medical care rendered there may
deduct under section 213 the cost of necessary meals and lodging at the
institution.6' If, however, the taxpayer is not primarily in the institution to
obtain medical care furnished there, the Treasury takes the position that the
cost of living at the institution is non-deductible.62
Precisely what types of establishments constitute institutions within the
meaning of Regulation section 1.213-1(e)(1)(v) remains an open question. The
Regulation itself states that a private establishment regularly engaged in pro-
viding medical services qualifies as an institution. The Regulation does not
state, however, that only such an establishment may be an institution.63 In
Kelly v. Commissioner, the Seventh Circuit seized upon the Regulation's
arguably incomplete definition to hold that a taxpayer's hotel room was an
59. The taxpayer's choice of where to receive medical care has been questioned in only
a small number of cases. See, e.g., Murray v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (P-H) 82,269, 1119
(1982) (no evidence that treatment taxpayer received in California was unavailable at residence
in New York); Winderman v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 1197, 1198 (1959) (taxpayer's confidence
in physician supported finding that primary purpose of trip was physical examination at previous
place of residence). If deductibility hinged on whether the taxpayer had made a reasonable deci-
sion regarding the place of treatment, the IRS and ultimately the courts likely would face the
difficult task of evaluating taxpayer behavior in terms of cost, relative advantage of one medical
institution over another, and effectiveness of treatment. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the courts
have generally avoided second-guessing the taxpayer on cost. The cost of the Cadillac Suite at
the hospital is just as deductible as the ten bed ward. For example, in Ferris v. Commissioner,
the Tax Court allowed nearly the full amount claimed by the taxpayer for an elaborate swimming
pool installed for medical reasons, in the face of the IRS contention that only the amount re-
quired for a bare-bones pool should be deductible. See 46 T.C.M. (P-H) 77,186 (1977); Feld,
supra note 33, at 188-92.
Still, the question of where to receive treatment has an important bearing on the medical
expenses discussed in this article. For example, a number of medical needs cannot be met at the local
hospital, clinic, or doctor's office. Sophisticated cancer treatment and organ transplants are pro-
minent examples. Two common-sense solutions to the problem are apparent: either bring the
treatment closer to the patient or bring the patient to the treatment. For instances of both see
Corporate Planes Transport Cancer Victims, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1983 at B5, col. 2; Cancer
Therapy is Widened in Communities Across U.S., N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1983 at B8, col. 3.
60. See Comrpissioner v. Bilder, 369 U.S. 499, 502-03 (1962) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. A60 (1954)); Levine v. Commissioner, 695 F.2d 57, 59 (2d Cir. 1982); Treas.
Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(v) (1982). The fact that meal and lodging costs are included in a hospital
bill, however, does not automatically make those costs deductible under § 213, particularly when
the hospital is merely serving as a middleman that arranges outpatient living accommodations.
See Hunt v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (P-H) 72,226 (1972).
61. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(v); see also Rev. Rul. 58-481, 1958-2 C.B. 107.
62. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(l)(v); see also Rev. Rul. 58-481, 1958-2 C.B. 107.
63. See Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e) (1982); see also Rev. Rul. 69-499, 1969-2 C.B. 89.
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institution and, therefore, that the taxpayer's hotel bill was deductible under
section 213.64 As is often the case, the equities in Kelly seem to have weighed
decisively in favor of a somewhat strained result.
In Kelly, a Wisconsin taxpayer suffered an appendicitis attack while in
New York on business . 6 He was hospitalized for surgery and developed com-
plications. Following his operation, the hospital discharged him because it
needed his room. Nonetheless, Kelly's doctor advised him not to return home
at that time because his wound had not yet healed fully, and because he was
too weak to move without assistance. Kelly left the hospital with the aid of
his wife and a nurse, and spent the following week in a hotel, room. While
he was in the hotel room, his wife provided him with necessary nursing care.
On appeal from a Tax Court decision denying Kelly a medical expense
deduction for his hotel bill, the IRS argued that the taxpayer was not entitled
to deduct his hotel bill because the hotel was not an institution.6 6 Clearly,
the hotel was not regularly engaged in providing medical care. Nonetheless,
the Kelly court held that the establishment's nature was not dispositive. Rather,
the court reasoned, the determination as to whether the hotel was an institu-
tion depended upon the taxpayer's condition and the nature of the services
he was receiving in the establishment. 7 Since Kelly's sole reason for being
in the hotel was to receive necessary medical treatment that he could no longer
get at the hospital, and since such treatment was provided in the hotel room,
the Kelly court held that the hotel was a substitute institution. 68
In Levine v. Commissioner,"' the Second Circuit was presented with an
opportunity to re-evaluate the Kelly decision's broad interpretation of "in-
stitution." Rather than doing so, the Second Circuit distinguished Kelly on
the facts, thereby leaving the door open for taxpayers in that circuit to invoke
64. 440 F.2d 307, 311 (7th Cir. 1971). Similar to the Seventh Circuit's decision in Kelly
are the Tax Court's decision in Ungar v. Commissioner, and the holding of the IRS in Rev.
Rul. 69-499, 1969-2 C.B. 39. See Ungar, 32 T.C.M. (P-H) 63,159 (1963). In Ungar, a taxpayer
rented a specially equipped apartment for his ill, dependent mother and engaged a nurse to render
care under a doctor's supervision at the apartment. In holding that the rental expense of the
apartment was deductible, the Tax Court reasoned that the rooms were retained for the purpose
of providing better and less expensive medical care on the premises than was available in a hospital.
See 32 T.C.M. (P-H) 63,159 (1963).
In Rev. Rul. 69-499, a mental retardate was placed in a private home near the hospital from
which he had been released, and the couple who owned the home was paid to care for and super-
vise the patient in accordance with his doctor's orders. The IRS ruled that on the particular facts
of the case, the home was an institution, and that amounts paid to maintain the patient in the
home were deductible under § 213. See 1969-2 C.B. at 39-40.
65. See 440 F.2d at 307.
66. See id. at 311.
67. See id.
68. See id. A key factor in the Kelly decision seems to have been that the taxpayer would
have remained in the hospital had it not been for the fact that he was discharged because of
the hospital's need for the use of his room. See id. at 308, 310. However, the Second Circuit
in a similar case, Levine v. Commissioner, impliedly held this factor not controlling. See 695
F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1982); infra text accompanying notes 69-74.
69. See 695 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1982).
[Vol. 41:453
MEAL AND LODGING COSTS
Kelly in the future." ° In Levine, the taxpayers' dependent son was a patient
at the Children's Hospital of the Menninger Clinic in Topeka, Kansas. When
he became too old to remain in that facility on an inpatient basis, his parents
rented an apartment for him in Topeka so that he could continue to receive
treatment at the Clinic. The taxpayers were forced to take this action because
their son had been diagnosed as too ill to enter the Clinic's adult, inpatient
living program.7"
On appeal from a Tax Court decision denying them a medical deduction
for the rental cost of their son's apartment, the taxpayers argued that under
Kelly the apartment was a substitute institution.72 Without expressly passing
on the correctness of Kelly, the Levine court held it inapplicable on the par-
ticular facts of the case. The patient in Levine, unlike the patient in Kelly,
received almost no medical care on the actual premises claimed to constitute
the substitute institution. 73 The ironic fact that the patient in Levine was too
ill to stay in the Clinic's adult inpatient program was impliedly held to be
inapposite.
The decision in Kelly, bolstered to a slight extent by Levine, may result
in an increasing number of taxpayers being able to deduct away-from-home
living costs as medical expenses in situations not normally thought of as in-
volving inpatient care. To take advantage of Kelly, a taxpayer clearly must
show that he is in the purported substitute institution to receive essential medical
care, and that such care is in fact being rendered there.7 5 Additionally, the
taxpayer may have to demonstrate the unavailability of normal inpatient
facilities. 7'6 If not for this latter requirement, taxpayers might be able to cir-
cumvent the congressional intent underlying section 213(e) by, for example,
traveling to Florida on their doctors' advice to alleviate specific medical prob-
lems, checking into a hotel, and hiring a nurse to administer necessary medical
care to them at the hotel.
When the taxpayer incurs living expenses at an away-from- home establish-
ment that does not qualify as a hospital or institution, the costs normally are
70. See id. at 60.
71. See id. at 58.
72. See id. at 60.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 59-61.
75. See id.; 440 F.2d at 311. Apart from Levine, at least two other decisions in the Tax
Court and one District Court decision have addressed the issue of what criteria the taxpayer
must meet to bring an alleged substitute institution within the Kelly doctrine. See Allen v. United
States, 46 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 5402 (D. Kan. 1980); Murray v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (P-H)
82,269 (1982); Volwiler v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 367 (1971). All three decisions rejected tax-
payer efforts to characterize outpatient living accommodations as substitute institutions because
no medical care was rendered at the respective places of lodging. See 46 A.F.T.R.2d at 5404;
51 T.C.M. (P-H) 82,269 at 1120; 57 T.C. at 372.
76. Although the court in Levine never referred to the potential requirement that normal
inpatient facilities must be unavailable, the decision in Kelly clearly turned to some extent on
the fact that Kelly had been forced to leave the hospital in which he was staying and go to a
hotel. See supra note 23.
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considered non-deductible outpatient expenses." The leading case on this point
is Commissioner v. Bilder.71 In Bilder, the Supreme Court was confronted
with a situation in which the taxpayer, upon doctor's orders, had spent the
winter in Florida as part of a general regimen of medical treatments for his
weak heart. The taxpayer, who was accompanied to Florida by his wife and
child, claimed a medical expense deduction for the cost of his Florida apart-
ment. The Tax Court held that the taxpayer was entitled to deduct that por-
tion of the rental expense attributable to the taxpayer, but not to his family.
79
The Third Circuit subsequently held that the full amount of the rent was a
deductible medical expense.80
Relying on the legislative history of section 213, the Supreme Court
reversed. Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, reasoned that section 213
was not clear on its face as to whether the taxpayer's rental expense was deduc-
tible, and that in the absence of such direct statutory guidance, reference to
Congress' intent was mandated. That intent, the Court held, was unmistak-
able: away-from-home, outpatient living expenses were not to be deducted
under section 213. In fact, the Bilder Court noted, the situation before the
Court was of precisely the type that Congress had spoken of in the Commit-
tee Reports regarding the 1954 Code.'
Arguably distinguishable from the situation presented in Bilder is the case
in which a taxpayer attempts to deduct meal and lodging costs incurred dur-
ing the actual transportation phase of his trip to obtain medical treatment.
This distinction finds some support in the case law. In Montgomery v. Com-
missioner, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a decision of a divided Tax Court that
had permitted a taxpayer to deduct away-from-home meal and lodging costs
incurred prior to the taxpayer's arrival at the place of medical treatment.
82
In upholding the Tax Court decision, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that Con-
gress intended only to eliminate the deduction of ordinary living expenses in-
curred while at the location of treatment and that expenses incurred in getting
to the place of treatment were a different matter.
8 3
In summary, meal and lodging costs are deductible under section 213 if
incurred in a hospital or a substitute institution." Living expenses incurred
during the actual transportation stage of travel to obtain medical care also
may be deductible medical expenses. 85 Outpatient living expenses at the place
77. See supra note 5; infra text accompanying notes 33-38.
78. 369 U.S. 499 (1962).
79. Bilder v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 155, remanded, 289 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1961), rev'd,
369 U.S. 499 (1962).
80. See 369 U.S. at 500-01.
81. See id. at 502. See supra text accompanying notes 55-58.
82. See 428 F.2d at 246, aff'g, 51 T.C. 410 (1968).
83. See id. at 245-46. By way of analogy to the "sleep or rest" rule of § 162, the Tax
Court has held that meals taken on relatively short trips do not qualify for a business expense
deduction unless medically necessary or required by the length of the trip. See Lopkoff v. Com-
missioner, 51 T.C.M. (P-H) 82,701 (1982).
84. See supra text accompanying notes 60-74.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
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of treatment, however, are not deductible under section 213.86 Transportation
costs, other than living expenses, are deductible if primarily for and essential
to obtaining medical care.87
IV. ARGUMENTS FOR BROADENING THE DEDUCTION
Had it so desired, Congress could have enacted an explicit prohibition
on the deduction under section 213 of all meals and lodging. Such an all en-
compassing ban, however, was not what Congress intended. Instead, Con-
gress' purpose was to foreclose the use of the medical expense deduction as
a subsidy for ordinary living expenses and for what were essentially vacations
on doctors' orders."8 By drafting the statute as it did, however, Congress not
only curtailed the deduction of ordinary living expenses incurred on medical
vacations, but also restricted the ability of taxpayers to deduct extraordinary
living costs necessarily incurred in obtaining away-from-home, outpatient
medical care.89
The problem with this harsh, shotgun-like solution is that it draws the
line between deductibility and nondeductibility in the wrong place. Deduc-
tibility depends not upon whether the expense is an extraordinary cost neces-
sarily incurred incidental to securing essential medical care, as opposed to an
ordinary living expense or abusive vacation cost, but rather upon whether the
person being treated is an inpatient or an outpatient.98 Outpatient expenses
are not necessarily coterminous with ordinary living expenses or with abusive
expenses. Similarly, inpatient expenses are not necessarily nonabusive in every
case.
Of course, one might argue that Congress needed to drav a bright line
in this area, and that the clearest demarcation available was between inpatient
86. See supra text accompanying notes 77-81.
87. See I.R.C. § 213(d)(1)(B) (West 1983). Transportation costs are not a deductible medical
expense if they are primarily a matter of the taxpayer's own choice, comfort, or convenience.
See, e.g., Cohn v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 387, 390-91 (1962).
88. The Treasury Department's summary of the proposed 1954 Code stated that it would:
... Permit deduction of cost of transportation necessary to health, but not ordinary
living expenses incurred during such trip.
Overall effect of proposed changes is to liberalize and extend relief in real hardship
situations due to heavy medical expense but curb deduction of ordinary or luxury liv-
ing expenses in guise of medical costs.
Hearings Before the Senate Finance Committee, 83d Cong., 2d. Sess. Pt. I, 103 (1954) (statement
of Marion B. Folsom, Under Secretary of the Treasury) (emphasis added).
The Senate Finance Committee Report echoed this statement:
A new definition of "medical expenses" is provided which allows the deduction of
only transportation expenses prescribed for travel or health, and not the ordinary "liv-
ing expenses incurred during such a trip." S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d. Sess.
35 (1954) (emphasis added).
89. The rule of nondeductibility is the consequence of the Supreme Court's decision in
Bilder. That the congressional intent to reach this result was far from clear is amply illustrated
by the variety of opinions that the case spawned at its various stages. See Bilder v. Commissioner,
33 T.C. 155 (1959), remanded, 289 F.2d 291 (3d. Cir. 1961), rev'd, 369 U.S. 499 (1962).
90. See Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(a) (1957).
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and outpatient living costs. After all, an alternative standard, such as the
legitimacy and reasonableness of the expenses sought to be deducted, would
lend itself to slippery and unpredictable ad hoc analysis in the courts. In
response to such a contention, however, this type of unpredictable, case-by-
case analysis is exactly what the courts and the IRS have been doing for years
in reviewing away-from-home business expense deductions, 9 ' and must still
do in the case of transportation which allegedly is required by medical needs.92
Secondly, the distinction that Congress did draw is hardly crystal clear. In
fact, it indirectly has led to litigation over the murky factual issue of what
constitutes a substitute institution.
93
Thirdly, a reading of the cases indicates that courts employing the pre-1954
law did a satisfactory job of policing abuses in the area. In several cases, the
courts disallowed meal and lodging expenses claimed by the taxpayer because
the expenses were considered to be too remotely connected to any specific
illness of the taxpayer. For example, in the leading pre-1954 Code case of
Havey v. Commissioner,94 the Tax Court denied a deduction to a taxpayer
and his wife for expenses of travel to and room and board while at resort
hotels in New Jersey and a ranch in Arizona. The wife had suffered a cor-
onary occlusion approximately two years prior to the expenditures and the
taxpayer claimed the expenditures were necessitated by his wife's heart condi-
tion. In denying the deduction, the court stated that "[t]o be deductible as a
medical expense, there must be a direct or proximate relation between the
expense and the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease.
S. .9 The court went on to say that "[t]he deduction in question may be
claimed only where there is a health or body condition coming within the
statutory concept and where the expense was incurred primarily for the preven-
tion or alleviation of such condition. An incidental benefit is not enough." 96
By contrast, when the facts were compelling, the deduction was allowed.
In another of the leading pre-1954 Code cases, Stringham v. Commissioner,"
the taxpayer's daughter suffered a severe respiratory ailment, and after an
91. See I.R.C. § 162(a)(2) (West 1983); United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967).
92. See, e.g., Murray v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (P-H) 82,269 (1982) (trips to Califor-
nia health spas by patient with fluid retention, underactive metabolism, low blood pressure, and
underactive thyroid resulting in weight gain); MizI v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (P-H) 80,277
(1980) (around-the-world trip by angina patient).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 60-74.
94. 12 T.C. 409 (1949).
95. Id. at 412.
96. Id. at 413 (emphasis by the court); accord Hoffman v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1380,
1386 (1952) ("[W]here the expense of meals and lodging are involved, the line must be drawn
at some point very much closer to the time of actual illness and the immediate recovery from
such illness than can be found in this proceeding."). In Hoffman, the taxpayer had paid board
and room for her son to go to college in California for the mild climate to alleviate rheumatic
fever, heart disease, and arthritis. The Hoffman court disallowed the deduction, because the ex-
penditures were not incurred primarily on account of the illness, but rather were primarily for
the son's education.
97. 12 T.C. 580 (1949), aff'd per curiam, 183 F.2d 589 (6th Cir. 1950).
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attack of the ailment, the child's doctor advised the taxpayer that the child
had to be moved to a warmer climate. The taxpayer sent the child to Arizona
where she attended school. The Tax Court allowed the full deduction for the
travel and for meals and lodging while in Arizona, but disallowed any deduc-
tions for expenses attributable to educational expenses. The court found that
the expenses of travel were proximately related to the child's illness and were
necessitated by that illness. 98 The court recognized that "it is obvious that
many expenses are so personal in nature that they may only in rare situations
lose their identity as ordinary personal expenses, and acquire deductibility as
amounts claimed primarily for the prevention or alleviation of disease." 99 The
Stringham court found, however, that in this particular case, that standard
had been met.'0I Whether the taxpayer could deduct these same expenses under
the present statute is doubtful unless the school could qualify as a special school
under the Treasury Regulations."'
In Erickson v. Commissioner,I2 the Tax Court disallowed the expenses
of looking, on a physician's advice, for a more congenial place to live. The
taxpayer traveled extensively throughout the year in question in search of a
suitable place to settle. The court strictly scrutinized the deductions and said,
"[t]he very character of the expenses here involved, lodging, makes it reasonable
to require a strong showing of the primary connection between the expense
and the cure or mitigation of the disease."'0 3 The court found that the travel
itself was not therapy and that, therefore, the attempted deduction for it was
impermissible.''0
The pre-1954 Code medical travel cases also seem to have written into
the statute, judicially, an away-from-home requirement similar to that applied
in the business expense area. In Rodgers v. Commissioner,' 5 the taxpayer
was advised by his doctor that a stable, warm, but not hot climate would
be beneficial to his condition of arteriosclerosis. Instead of moving to a warmer
climate, the taxpayer decided to retain his home in St. Louis, but to go away
during the winter and summer of each year. The court disallowed the cost
of these trips on the ground that the taxpayer's decision was motivated by
purely personal considerations, that is, his desire to continue to maintain his
household in St. Louis, and that therefore the trips were not necessitated by
medical reasons, but rather were undertaken for personal reasons.10 6 This is
obviously the same kind of reasoning found in business travel cases under
section 162. As in those cases, it is an adequate, if not perfect, safeguard
against taxpayers spending long periods in vacation-type surroundings and then
98. Id. at 586.
99. Id. at 584.
100. Id. at 585.
101. See Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(v).
102. 23 T.C.M. (P-H) 54,303 (1954).
103. Id. at 963.
104. Id.
105. 241 F.2d 552 (8th Cir. 1957), aff'g 25 T.C. 254 (1955).
106. Id. at 554-55.
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deducting their vacation costs on the ground that they need a milder climate
to alleviate a medical condition. Concededly, application of the away-from-
home requirement has caused some difficulty in business travel cases when
the -question of whether the taxpayer was away from home was a close one. 7
Nevertheless, by applying rules of thumb, such as the concept of a tax home,
reaching appropriate results is possible in the vast majority of cases without
undue difficulty or uncertainty," 8 even though such rules of thumb cannot
cover all possible applications.
The courts have been equally scrupulous in safeguarding the currently
allowed medical transportation expense' 9 from abuse. For example, in Foyer
v. Commissioner,"' the taxpayer took trips to Hawaii and Tucson, that,
although beneficial to the respiratory condition of taxpayer's wife, were not
recommended by a physician. They were accompanied by their daughter on
the trip to Hawaii, and on their return route they visited another daughter
in Oregon. The Tax Court disallowed the transportation costs of these trips,
stating: "Trips such as the ones in question 'to resort areas are naturally suspect
when the expenses therefor are claimed as a medical deduction, and we must
carefully scrutinize the facts to make sure that the alleged medical reasons
were not merely a pretext for a vacation trip."""' The court emphasized its
scrutinous attitude, saying, "[t]he existence of a chronic respiratory condition
... is not a carte blanche authorizing travels throughout the world without
medical advice of any type in search of climates offering greater relief to the
condition." ' '
Admittedly, in a few cases under pre-1954 law, the courts seemingly failed
to police the deduction adequately." 3 The point, however, is not that tax-
107. See, e.g., Rosenspan v. Commissioner, 438 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 864, reh. denied, 404 U.S. 959 (1971); Harvey v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1960).
108. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 75-543, 1975-2 C.B. 60.
109. See I.R.C. § 213(d)(1)(B) (West 1983).
110. 29 T.C.M. (P-H) 60,244 (1960).
111. Id. at 1523; accord Carasso v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 1139, 1141 (1960), acq. 1961-2
C.B. 4, aff'd, 292 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 874 (1963).
112. 29 T.C.M. (P-H) 60,244 at 1523; accord MizI v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (P-H)
80,227 at 1010 ("The Court will not permit taxpayers to turn personal expenses into medical
expenses even when the trip is partly medically motivated.").
113. In Duff v. Commissioner, the taxpayer traveled to Florida to alleviate a psoriasis con-
dition. See 22 T.C.M. (P-H) 53,362 (1953). The therapy in Florida consisted of the taxpayer
spending most of his time sunning himself. The court found that the taxpayer's purpose in going
to Florida was solely to obtain relief from his psoriasis condition and the court allowed the deduction.
Although the taxpayer was elderly and in bad physical condition, this may have been an abuse
situation, since the activities on the trip consisted of the kind of thing that one typically does
on a vacation. In Watkins v. Commissioner, the taxpayer, on the advice of a physician, traveled
to Florida during the winter and early spring months to get the heat of the sun, which would
dry up an inflammation at the back of his nose and throat. See 23 T.C.M. (P-H) 54,102 (1954).
This inflammation was causing him to go progressively deaf. The taxpayer's wife also went to
Florida on the advice of a physician to alleviate an arthritic condition. The conditions of both
the taxpayer and his wife were mitigated by the trip to Florida. The court found that the tax-
payers' motivation in the Florida trips was bona fide, and that their conditions were sufficiently
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payers in a few cases were able to obtain the benefits of personal consump-
tion on a tax-deductible basis. It is rather that in the greater number of cases,
the courts clearly were able to distinguish instances in which medical necessity
was the primary reason for the expenditure from those instances in which tax-
payers were attempting to deduct personal travel in the guise of medically
necessary expenditures. A reading of the cases indicates that the degree of
abuse that taxpayers actually managed to perpetrate under the pre-1954 law
may have been exaggerated by those who were alarmed by it.
The Bilder"4 case itself was a clear example of a situation in which the
expenditures were without doubt primarily medically related. The taxpayer
suffered from an acute coronary condition. His trips to Florida, advised by
his physician, caused him inconvenience, and also required that he be away
from his law practice for considerable periods of time." 5 There was simply
no personal consumption motivation in the Florida trips. Under the pre-1954
law, his travel costs probably would have been allowable deductions. However,
under the interpretation given the post-1954 law by the Supreme Court, they
were disallowed. Thus, the taxpayer in Bilder was made to pay for the allegedly
abusive deductions of taxpayers in prior years.
The question ultimately is whether prevention of a perceived and likely
exaggerated abuse on the part of some taxpayers outweighs the inequity of
disallowing deductions in situations in which the expense primarily is related
and essential to medical care. The occurrence of an occasional abuse case should
not be reason for disallowing the deduction in situations in which the expen-
diture clearly is related to medical care. The current state of the law in this
area simply cannot be justified from the standpoint of ease in policing the
genuineness of medical deductions.
A more significant problem, at least from a theoretical standpoint, arises
from the fact that the failure to take into account outpatient living costs
necessarily incurred in obtaining extraordinary, away-from-home medical treat-
ment results in a skewed measurement of income. The rationale for allowing
a medical expense deduction is that such costs reduce a taxpayer's ability to
pay and, therefore, must be accounted for in a correct measurement of
income." 6 A medical expense is considered to be largely involuntary and is
related to such trips to allow the deduction. Id. at 365-66. The court went on, however, to say
that "if the conclusion reached ...appears to be unduly generous, the remedy lies with the
Congress." Id. at 366; see also Embry v. Gray, 143 F. Supp. 603 (W.D. Ky. 1956) (deduction
allowed for husband's and wife's expefises, including hotel and meals, of trip to Florida taken
to alleviate husband's diseased vascular and circulatory system even though wife accompanied
him and he spent considerable time engaging in vacation type activities). The case may have been
the classic one of the disguised vacation trip.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 78-81.
115. See 33 T.C. at 156-57; cf. Levine v. Commissioner, 695 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1983)
(Winter, J., Dissenting) ("Because both Congress and the appropriate regulatory authorities have
decided that the danger to the federal fisc of slippery slope analysis outweighs an ostensibly fairer
and more searching approach, we must deny the deduction.").
116. See e.g., S. REP. No. 494, Vol. 1, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 113, reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 781,881.
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incurred not in the course of everyday personal consumption, but rather to
put a person in a position to engage in personal consumption.II 7 To the extent
this rationale holds, the medical expense deduction is not only justifiable, but
actually necessary in order to maintain both vertical and horizontal equity
among taxpayers. It follows that if truly necessary, extraordinary travel costs
incidental to medical care are not allowed to be deducted, the taxpayer's in-
come is overstated.
In evaluating a deduction's propriety, one commentator has suggested that
appropriate criteria are whether the provision contributes to an accurate
measure of income, and whether the provision contributes to the basic ra-
tionale for the deduction. " 8 Under both these criteria, the present blanket
disallowance of all meal and lodging expenses while obtaining away-from-home
medical care, clearly fails the test. Under the first criterion, unless one believes
that all medical expenditures regardless of the expenditures' origin or magnitude
are personal consumption, extraordinary expenditures for travel to receive out-
patient medical care which exceed the current five percent of adjusted gross
income limit reduce a taxpayer's available income." 9 With respect to the sec-
ond criterion, the expressed rationale for the deduction is that extraordinary
medical expenditures lower a taxpayer's ability to pay and should, therefore,
be removed from the tax base.2 0 To deny a deduction of expenditures for
away-from-home meals and lodging necessary for medical care simply because
the meals and lodging are not received in an "institution" clearly has little
to do with the deduction's rationale. The rationale is based on the medical
necessity of the extraordinary expenditure, not the nonmedical circumstances
under which the expenditure is made nor the place in which services are
received. I21
Once one admits that a deduction for extraordinary medical expenses is
justifiable, then equity requires a deduction for away-from-home meals and
lodging necessarily incurred in obtaining essential outpatient treatment. Given
the rationale of the deduction, no reason exists to differentiate away-from-
home, outpatient meal and lodging expenses incurred on account of medical
necessity from other expenses of a medical nature. If the former expenses are
117. See id.; supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
118. Turnier, Evaluating Personal Deductions in an Income Tax - The Ideal, 66 CORNELL
L. REv. 262, 263 (1981).
119. Simons described income in part as "the exercise of control over the use of society's
scarce resources." H. SIoMs, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATiON 61-62 (1938). An essentially involun-
tary expenditure necessitated by a medical condition is difficult to fit within the idea of control.
The fact that the public in general has been willing to subsidize medical expenditures directly
through medicare and medicaid is some indication that most persons intuitively consider large
medical expenses as reducing one's ability to control resources and hence income.
120. See supra note 17.
121. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(v) (1982):
The extent to which expenses for care in an institution other than a hospital shall constitute
medical care is primarily a question of fact which depends upon the condition of the individual
and the nature of the services he receives (rather than the nature of the institution).
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incurred as a direct result of illness, and if they would not have been incurred
but for the illness,' 22 then they reduce the taxpayer's ability to pay as much
as any other medical expense and, therefore, the former expenses are com-
pletely within the rationale and purpose of the medical expense deduction.
Furthermore, the deduction is aimed at extraordinary expenses, and travel
expenses in connection with medical necessity certainly can be classified as
extraordinary. A taxpayer who must travel to a distant city, stay in hotels
or motels, and purchase his meals in restaurants certainly is incurring expenses
beyond the ordinary needs of one's everyday existence. Of course, in this situa-
tion one's meals include some element that would have had to have been spent
in any event, but the difference between the cost of restaurant-purchased meals
and those consumed at home is considerable. Although it would be theoretically
more accurate to allow the taxpayer to deduct only the excess of the cost of
the restaurant meals over what it would have cost to eat at home, this would
most likely prove to be administratively unworkable.'23 In sum, proper measure-
ment of an individual's tax base requires the deductibility of away-from-home
outpatient living expenses.
A second flaw in the current nondeductibility under section 213 of away-
from-home outpatient living costs is the disparity between the treatment ac-
corded away-from-home business expenses" ' and away-from-home medical
expenses. Since both business and extraordinary medical expenses reduce a
taxpayer's ability to pay taxes, it is anomalous to allow a deduction for away-
from-home meals and lodging when necessary for business,' 2s but to disallow
a deduction for the same type of expenditures when they are incurred necessarily
in obtaining outpatient medical care. The same problems of application arise
with respect to section 162 business expense deductions as occur in connection
with section 213 deductions.' 26 Many business trips, especially to conventions,
involve a large amount of personal consumption.' 27 Also business expense
122. See Jacobs v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 813, 819 (1974); Wilks v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M.
1196 (P-H) 68,220 (1968); Rev. Rul. 76-79, 1976-1 C.B. 70; Rev. Rul. 75-187, 1975-1 C.B.
92; see also Feld, supra note 33, at 178-81 (discussion of application of "but for" test).
123. Prior to enactment of the predecessor of § 162, § 214 of the Revenue Act of 1921,
42 Stat. 239, a Treasury Regulation had allowed deduction of "travelling expenses, including
railroad fares, and meals and lodging in an amount in excess of any expenditure ordinarily re-
quired for such expenses when at home." T.D. 3101 amending Article 292 of Regs. 45, III C.B.
191 (1920). The statute was amended at the request of the Treasury to allow full deduction for
meals and lodging because administering the "excess" standard had proved unduly difficult. See
Rosenspan v. Commissioner, 438 F.2d 905, 912 (2d Cir. 1971).
124. See I.R.C. § 162(a)(2) (West 1983).
125. In practice the standard is less than strict necessity. A business person undertaking travel
connected with the business is likely to be allowed a deduction if the travel is "appropriate"
and "helpful" to the business and the primary purpose of the travel is business rather than per-
sonal consumption. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2; Klein, The Deductibility of Transportation Ex-
penses of a Combination Business and Pleasure Trip -A Conceptual Analysis, 18 STAN. L. REv.
1099, 1104-07 (1966); cf. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
126. See Klein, supra note 125 (discussion of problems involved with applying business travel
deduction).
127. See generally id.
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deductions under section 162 allow the taxpayer to engage in consumption
and deduct the consumption, when part of that consumption would have been
non-deductible had the taxpayer not been away from home. Thus the same
kind of potential for abuse exists with respect to the away-from-home travel
expense deduction under section 162 as with respect to medical travel under
section 213. But no sentiment seems to exist for completely disallowing away-
from-home business travel expenses, although there might be some sentiment
for limiting that deduction.' 28
To place taxpayers traveling for medical necessity on a parity with those
traveling for business reasons, similar standards should be applied. The abuse
potential can be handled in any of several ways by the courts and IRS. In
the case of the taxpayer whose physician advises living in a warm climate,
but who chooses for personal reasons to maintain a home in a cold one and
to travel for long periods of time to warmer climes, the away-from-home test
could be applied much as it is in the section 162 area.' 29 Thus, the courts
could apply a test that asks whether it is reasonable for the taxpayer to remain
in his present home rather than move permanently to the warmer climate.'
A useful analogy also may be drawn to the origin of the claim test employed
under Code section 212 pertaining to deductibility of legal expenses.' 3 ' Under
that test, courts reviewing an attempted section 212 deduction for legal ex-
penses look to the origin of the dispute that led to the legal expense. Similarly,
a court might ask whether the origin of an attempted medical travel expense
was in the taxpayer's condition, or rather, in the taxpayer's personal desire
to travel to a particular place. This concept was alluded to in the Havey case
in which the court stated that it was important "to inquire as to the origin
of the expense."'
32
A third safeguard would be to prohibit taxpayers from being allowed to
deduct estimates of their medical travel expenses under the Cohan rule. 133 This
could be accomplished by enacting a provision similar to that in section 274
128. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 274(c) (West 1983) (placing mild limitations on deduction for foreign
travel); id. § 274(h) (placing limits on deductions for attendance at conventions outside the "North
American area" and for attendance at conventions on cruise ships). Code §§ 274(c) and (h) cer-
tainly indicate no overwhelming tide of opinion against the business travel deduction.
129. Cf. Rogers v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 552 (8th Cir. 1957) (court in § 213 situation
in effect applied an away-from-home test similar to that applied under § 162); see supra text
accompanying notes 126-128.
130. Compare Rosenspan v. United States, 438 F.2d 905 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
864, reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 959 (1971); with Rev. Rul. 75-432, 1975-2 C.B. 60. Perhaps a "medical
home" rule could be formulated analogous to'the "tax home" rule applied in business travel cases.
131. See United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
132. 12 T.C. 409, 412 (1949).
133. See Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930). In Cohan the taxpayer was
permitted a deduction based on a conservative estimate of the expenditures when he did not have
records of the expenditures but the court was convinced from the factual situation that expen-
ditures actually had been made. Id. at 544. Under the pre-1954 Code law, taxpayers were permit-
ted to take medical travel deductions based on the Cohan rule. See, e.g., Stringham v. Commis-
sioner, 12 T.C. 580, 586 (1949).
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which requires detailed substantiation of certain business travel expenses.' 34
In summary, harking back to the hypothetical in the introduction to this arti-
cle, if the medical expense deduction is in itself a justifiable one, no good
reason exists why taxpayer B should be allowed to deduct his away-from-home
meal and lodging expense while Taxpayer C cannot.
Another argument in favor of allowing the deduction is that disallowance
runs contrary to national medical policy. Under the current law, section 213
deductibility of away-from-home meals and lodging hinges on whether a tax-
payer is an inpatient or an outpatient. The tax law, therefore, provides a tax
incentive for inpatient status. At the same time, outpatient treatment is often
considerably less expensive. Since government provides a large amount of the
cost of medical services through the Medicare and Medicaid programs, it has
a substantial interest in encouraging patients to choose the less costly means
of receiving medical care. 3 It hardly makes sense for the federal government
to discourage taxpayers on the one hand from using outpatient treatment,
while on the other hand paying for the more expensive inpatient treatment.
The inequity of denying all deductions for meals and lodging related to
medical travel will be exacerbated as time goes on. The increasing trend has
been for patients to use outpatient facilities more and more frequently. Out-
patient treatment has increased markedly since the mid 1960's.' 36 As medical
care, especially for serious illnesses, becomes more sophisticated a movement
is bound to develop toward the use of regional facilities equipped with the
most advanced technological equipment, to which patients from surrounding
areas will come for treatment. This necessarily will entail in many cases the
134. I.R.C. § 274(d) (West 1983).
135. See G. Markus, Issue Brief No. IB82128, Health Care Cost Containment: Major Issues
in the 98th Congress at CRS-1 to -7 (Library of Congress Congressional Research Service 1983).
Tables 3 and 4 of this study provide the following data:
TABLE 3. Percentage distribution of personal health care expenditures, by source of
funds, selected years
Direct Private Public
patient insurance State &
Year Total payments and other Total Federal Local
1950 100%0 65.5% 12.0% 22.4% 10.4% 12.0%
1960 100 54.9 23.4 21.8 9.3 12.5
1970 100 39.9 25.6 34.5 22.3 12.2
1981 100 32.1 27.6 40.4 29.3 11.1
TABLE 4. Estimated Federal outlays for Medicare and Medicaid, FY83-85 (in billions)
FY83 FY83 FY85
Medicare ................................... $55.5 $63.6 $72.4
M edicaid ................................... 19.9 21.6 24.7
$75.4 $85.2 $97.1
136. See Price & Lundy, Issue Brief No. IB 77066, HealthCare Expenditures and Prices
at CRS-8 (Library of Congress Congressional Research Service 1983). Table 8 of this study pro-
vides the following data with respect to the trend in outpatient treatment:
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very kind of expense being discussed here.'37 As this occurs, the inequities
involved in disallowing the deduction will become more acute.
Another reason for allowing the deduction of away-from-home outpa-
tient living expenses is that they generally are not reimbursed by Medicare,
Medicaid or conventional medical insurance policies. 38 Such expenses usually
must be borne in their entirety by the individual patients themselves or their
families, unless assistance is received from some charitable or welfare agency.
The allowance of a tax deduction for away-from-home outpatient expenses
would at least ameliorate, if not fully remedy, the hardships arising from in-
adequate health insurance.
One argument has been made in opposition to allowing the deduction is
that under present budgetary circumstances, no additional expansions of the
personal deductions are appropriate. In the face of mounting deficits it is argued
that expansion of the personal deductions involve the unwarranted diminu-
tion of federal revenues. In fact, the recent Tax Equity and Fiscal Respon-
sibility Act greatly reduced the medical expense deduction by raising the floor




Year Admissions days visits beds
1965 138 1,073 483 3.9
1970 145 1,198 662 4.2
1971 148 1,188 727 4.2
1972 149 1,174 788 4.3
1973 152 1,191 832 4.3
1974 157 1,217 901 4.4
1975 158 1,219 902 4.5
1976 160 1,224 945 4.5
1977 160 1,215 925 4.5
1978 159 1,211 933 4.5
1979 161 1,214 910 4.5
1980 160 1,211 897 4.4
137. A study of cancer patients by the Mid-Missouri Professional Standards Review Organiza-
tion came to the conclusion that for cancer patients travel was a considerable part of their medical
expenses. The study found further that because Medicare would reimburse them for inpatient
care but not outpatient, the patients tended to opt for inpatient treatment. "In reality, what
happens is that physicians are fully aware of the psycho-social-economic problems of the patients
and will document the medical record to allow certification for inpatient care." D. Westhoff
& T. Mangus, Proposed Alternative Housing for Treatment of Radiation/Chemo Therapy (Sept.
10, 1980) (federal grant application) (on file in Washington & Lee Law Review office).
138. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(s) (1976) (defining medical and other health services reimbur-
sable under the medicare program). Private medical insurance contracts, like the publicly funded
insurance programs, typically cover the costs of inpatient treatment and professional services
provided on an outpatient basis. See IC J. APPLEmAN & J. APPLEMAN, INSURAN cE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 707.65 (1981); 0. DICKERSON, HEALTH INSURANCE 159-61, 165 (rev. ed. 1963); D.
GREGO & V. LucAs, Lun AND HEALTH INSURANCE HANDBOOK 297-300 (3d ed. 1973).
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on the deduction from three to five percent of adjusted gross income.139
There are two answers to this objection: (1) the amount of revenue lost
would be small in comparison to the medical expense deduction as a whole,
and miniscule in comparison to the total federal budget;'4 and (2) any lost
revenues could be at least partially recouped by tightening the definition of
allowable expenses involving procedures that affect a structure or function
of the body. As the law now stands, a taxpayer can deduct expenses that af-
fect a structure or function of the body, even though the expenses are not
medically necessary, nor even, in the minds of most persons, a medical
expense.' 4 ' If the law were to be changed so as to require that such procedures
medically be required to be deductible, the additional revenue gained from
not allowing deductions for non-medically necessary procedures such as
cosmetic surgery would at least in part make up for the revenue lost through
allowance of the travel expense deduction.
No hard data on this potential revenue offset is readily available, so the
exact fiscal effect is basically a matter of conjecture. However, some revenue
would be saved by requiring that these kinds of procedures be medically
necessary. This requirement, of course, would involve another difficult line-
drawing task, since it could be contended in many cases that, for example,
a face lift medically was required for the psychological health of the patient.
However, the taxpayer must prove the necessity in such a situation, and at
least some clearly unjustifiable deductions would be disallowed by amending
the law in such a way. By allowing meal and lodging deductions for medical
travel and disallowing deductions for cosmetic procedures which affect a struc-
ture or function of the body, the revenue lost by the former at least in part
could be offset by revenue gained from the latter. Moreover, this would bring
the law into closer conformity to its original rationale of providing relief against
extraordinary expense caused by loss of health. Although this is not a perfect
solution, a perfect solution is likely not available because of the lack of perfect
information about what is and is not medically necessary.' 2 In this situation,
the question becomes whether one is willing to accept second-best.
139. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, § 202, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat.
324, 421 (1982).
140. Exact figures on the probable revenue loss from allowing a § 213 deduction for away-
from-home living expenses are elusive. The House Ways and Means Committee estimated the
revenue loss from a deduction limited to $50 per night per person for lodging at only $7 million
to $11 million per year for fiscal years 1985-1988. H.R. REP. No. 98-432, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
280 (1983); see infra text accompanying notes 159-63.
141. I.R.C. § 213(d)(l)(A) (West 1983). See, e.g., Mattes v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 650,
656 (1981) (hair transplant deductible); Rev. Rul. 82-111, 1982-1 C.B. 48 (hair transplant, elec-
trolysis deductible); Rev. Rul. 76-332, 1976-2 C.B. 81 (face-lift operation deductible).
142. See Stiglitz & Boskin, Impact of Recent Developments in Public Finance Theory on
Public Policy Decisions, 67 Ari. EcoN. REv. 295 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Stiglitz].
The problem of taxation in an economy such as ours is viewed as a problem of indirect
control of imperfectly observable variables; the government for instance, might like
to exempt "necessary" medical expenses, but finds it difficult (costly) to distinguish
between these and "unnecessary" medical expenses.
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A final argument which has been made in opposition to the deductibility
of extraordinary, away-from-home outpatient living costs is that the medical
expense deduction is a tax subsidy for the wealthy.' 3 However, a large por-
tion of the deductions for medical expenses are taken by low income groups. I4
The reasons for this are probably: (1) that the floor on the deduction prevents
many higher-income taxpayers from having expenses in excess of the floor
amount; and (2) that illness is much more likely to occur among the elderly
groups who quite often are in lower income groups.
In conclusion, sound tax policy dictates that the current rules regarding
away-from-home outpatient living expenses be modified so as to provide for
the deductibility of such expenses if extraordinary and incurred in connection
with the procurement of essential medical services.
V. CURXENT PROPOSALS
Given the harshness of the current law regarding the deductibility under
section 213 of away-from-home meal and lodging costs, various proposals have
surfaced for the amendment of the medical expense provision. These proposals
can be divided into three categories: those that limit the deduction to minors
and their accompanying parents or guardians; those that are not limited to
minors and their parents, but which do place other substantial limitations on
143. The argument that the medical expense deduction is a tax subsidy for the wealthy is
basically a version of the now prevalent tax expenditure concept, i.e., that any "tax preference"
constitutes an indirect government expenditure. The literature on this subject is so voluminous
and well-known as to require no citation and a discussion is beyond the scope of this article.
See Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison
With Direct Government Expenditures, 83 H~Av. L. Rav. 705 (1970) (classic exposition of tax
expenditure concept); Surrey and McDaniel; The Tax Expenditure Concept: Current Developments
and Emterging Issues, 20 B.C. IND. CoM. L. 225 (1979)
We have three major objections to ihis concept. First, as presently formulated, the
measurement of forgone revenue implicitly assumes zero elasticities; the estimates of
aggregate tax expenditures are correct only when one contemplates eliminating all devia-
tions from taxing real economic income simultaneously and if the factors of produc-
tion are in perfectly inelastic supply (which Boskin 1977 and Heckman 1974, among
others, demonstrate is not the case). Further, the estimates for particular so-called tax
preferences are often extremely inaccurate. For example, if the tax law allows a deduc-
tion for charitable contributions, it is not correct to argue that abolishing the deduc-
tion will increase tax revenue by (the summing over all contributors who itemize deduc-
tions) the product of the marginal tax rate and the amount currently given to charity.
The amount of resources following into each such "tax expenditure" category reflects
the tax treatment of that category as well as others....
Second, as pointed out recently by Feldstein, government spending on an activity
such as charity may decrease private spending on the commodity.... Third, the tax expen-
diture concept suffers from a further defect: the legislation implicitly assumed that
the "natural" tax base is income, broadly defined; as we shall argue below, there is
one needs to know what "ought' to be taxed.
Id.
144. See Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income 1980, Individual Income Tax Returns
Table 2.1 at 56.
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the deduction; and those that apply standards similar to the business travel
deduction. We first address the proposals in the first category.
The first of these, S. 2938, introduced in September 1982, proposed to
modify section 213 to include within medical care expenses the cost of meals
and lodging incurred by a child away from home to obtain medical care on
an outpatient basis."4 5 Under this proposal, the mal and lodging expenses
of one parent or guardian who accompanies the child patient also would be
deductible.' 4 6 A House version of this bill, H.R. 2720, was introduced in April
1983 under the Title of the Medical Expense Deduction Act of 1983.147 Neither
bill has been reported out by its committee.
The most notable aspect of these bills is that they would provide relief
only when a child, defined as anyone who has not attained age eighteen by
the close of the tax year in question,' 8 is the away-from-home patient. Per-
sons over eighteen, or their families who support them, who have to travel
out of town for medical care on an outpatient basis still will be unable to
deduct their living expenses, no matter how deeply those expenses cut into
their ability to pay taxes. Because of this limited coverage, the proposed bills,
albeit a step in the right direction, fall short of correcting the" current inequity." 9
145. S. 2938, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc. S12000-01 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1982).
This bill was reintroduced in 1983 and referred to the Senate Finance Committee. S. 824, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). The bill reads as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. TREATMENT OF CERTAIN MEALS AND CERTAIN LODGING EXPENSES OF A PARENT
AND CHILD AS MEDICAL CARE IN THE CASE OF A CHILD ANVAY FROM HOME FOR PURPOSE
OF RECEIVING MEDICAL CARE.
(a) IN GENERAL-Paragraph (1) of section 213(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
(defining medical care) is amended-
(l)by striking out "or" at the end of subparagraph (B).
(2)by striking out the period at the end of subparagraph (C) and inserting in lieu thereof
", or", and
(3)by adding at the end thereof the following new subparagraph:
"(D) for the meals and lodging of-
"(i) one parent or guardian of a child when-
"(I) such child is away from home for the purpose of receiving medical care, and
"(II) such parent or guardian is away from home and accompanies such child, and
"(ii) a child when he is away from home for the purpose of receiving medical care
as an outpatient.".
(b)CHILD DEFINED.-Subsection (d) of section 213 of such Code is amended by adding
at the end thereof the following new paragraph:
"(7) The term 'child' means an individual who has not attained the age of 18 before
the close of the taxable year.".
146. See supra note 145.
147. H.R. 2720, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). The House bill follows verbatim the Senate
bill. Compare id. with note 145, supra.
148. See S. 824, 98 Cong., Ist Sess. (1983); H.R. 2720, 98 Cong., 1st Sess.
149. Of course, by restricting the deduction's availability to situations in which the away-
from-home patient is a child, the proposed bills threaten a less severe drain on the Treasury
than would a proposal containing no age limitations. However, as stated above, at least some
of the revenue loss resulting from an amendment of § 213 could be offset by foreclosing the deduc-
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Another drawback to these bills is their failure fully to address the perceived
problem that led originally to the nondeductibility of away-from-home, out-
patient living expenses: the abusive deduction of vacation and pleasure trip
costs. The proposed bills place no express restrictions on what type of away-
from-home living costs are deductible, other than those limitations inherent
in the fact that the patient must be a child and only one parent or guardian
may accompany the patient. Perhaps persons under eighteen years of age are
less likely than adults to take the type of medical vacations Congress saw as
abusive in 1954. That is not to say, however, that some would not. More
significantly, the proposals contain no explicit requirement that the parent
or guardian accompanying the child patient out of town do so to contribute
to the child's medical care and well being."' Under the bills in question, a
parent could perhaps accompany his or her ill child to Florida, drop the child
off at a hospital for a week of treatment, head for the beach, pick the child
up a week later and write off the entire trip. Some requirement for a nexus
between the accompanying adult's presence and the minor patient's health
is necessary. These bills appear to be well-intentioned compromises. The bills
recognize the inequity of the present law. However, in order to make a change
politically palatable, the bills are so restricted in application that they fail to
address the problem fully. They represent an improvement, but fall short of
the most desirable solution.
Turning to the proposed amendments not restricting deductibility to minors
and parents, but placing other restrictions on the deduction, two such pro-
posals recently have been presented to an ABA Tax Section Subcommittee,
the first reads in pertinent part as follows:
Section 213(d)(1) is amended to read as follows (with the added
portions [italicized] and deleted portions in brackets): (1) The term
"medical care" means amounts paid-(A) for the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose
of affecting any structure or function of the body. (B) for traveling
expenses (including amounts expended for meals and lodging up to
but not exceeding the United States Government Employee per diem
allowance for travel to the location of medical care) while away from
home [for transportation] primarily for and essential to medical care
as defined in subparagraph (A), provided that costs for meals and
lodging shall be allowed only if the medical care requires actual medical
treatment which is: (i) conducted in a hospital "or other medical care
tion's applicability to certain medical procedures, such as cosmetic surgery, that plainly constitutes
optional, personal consumption. See supra text accompanying note 25. And although "fairness"
is an elusive concept, most persons would probably agree that something is amiss when one can
write off the cost of a nose job, but not necessary living expenses incurred in receiving life saving
outpatient treatment away from home.
150. See S. 824, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R.2720, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. As mentioned
previously, such a nexus is currently required under case law in order for an "accompanying"
family member to deduct their transportation costs.
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delivery facility licensed by the Joint Commission for the Accredita-
tion of Hospitals; and (ii) by or under the direct supervision of a
licensed physician, at the place described in subparagraph (i)(C) for
expenses of the type described in subparagraph (B) incurred by adult
family members primarily for the purpose of attending a patient receiv-
ing such treatment, where the adult family member's attendance is
necessary and appropriate under all of the circumstances. Family
member for this purpose includes only a spouse, a parent (natural
or adoptive) or guardian of a minor child or a child who is physically
or mentally incapacitated such as to require the presence of a family
member, and a child, other descendant or guardian of a person who
is physically or mentally incapacitated such as to require the presence
of a family member. I51
This proposal (Proposal I) has several positive features. First, and perhaps
foremost, the proposal does not limit the deductibility of outpatient meal and
lodging costs under section 213 to cases where the patient is a minor. Second,
while H.R. 2-720 and S. 2938 provide for the deductibility only of meal and
lodging expenses incurred by an accompanying parent or guardian, this sug-
gested amendment would permit a broader class of accompanying persons to
deduct their living expenses in cases where they could show that their presence
was necessary and appropriate.' 2
Third, the proposal contains certain specific limitations designed to pre-
vent the type of abusive vacation deductions Congress sought to foreclose in
1954. More particularly, the proposed amendment would put a ceiling on the
allowable amount of deductible meal and lodging expenses. The away-from-
home patient's meal and lodging deduction would be limited to the amount
of the United States Government Employee per diem travel allowance for the
place traveled to.' 5 3 The living expenses of accompanying family members,
if any, would be subject to the same limitation. Moreover, the possibilities
for abuse further are limited by the requirements that the deduction be allowed
only if the medical care requires actual medical treatment which is (1) con-
ducted in a duly licensed hospital or other medical care delivery facility, and
151. Letter from John A. Townsend to George Middleton, Jr., Chairman, Subcommittee
on Non-Business and Other Deductions of the Committee on General Income Tax Problems,
American Bar Association Section of Taxation, at 2 (May 3, 1983) (on file in the Washington
& Lee Law Review office).These are proposals only and have not yet received official sanction
from any ABA group.
152. See supra text accompanying note 151.
153. See id. One interesting question raised by this proposal is whether the per diem limita-
tion would apply to inpatient, as well as outpatient, meal and lodging costs. Pursuant to current
law, of course, inpatient living costs are fully deductible under the theory that they constitute
direct medical expenses under § 213(d)(1)(A). See supra text accompanying note 60. If Congress
adopted the proposal without commenting on this problem, however, it might be argued by the
IRS that the inclusion of travel expenses under § 213(d)(1)(B) evidenced an intent to withdraw
inpatient living costs from subsection (d)(l)(A) and subject them to the per diem ceilings also.
Although this is a tenuous argument, clarification is needed.
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(2) by or under the direct supervision of a licensed physician at the place to
which the travel is undertaken. 154 Under this proposal, therefore, the "medical
care" would have to be conducted in a hospital or similar facility, and would
have to be under the supervision of a licensed physician. This proposal would
avoid the problem of the person who travels to a desirable area at the advice
of a physician at home or at his own initiative, and does not receive treatment
at some medical facility but rather receives poolside or golf course medica-
tion. Interestingly enough, however, this provision might result in the tax-
payer in Bilder still being denied the deduction, because in that case, although
the taxpayer chose the place of residence in Florida to be near a qualified
hospital, his treatment at the hospital was not the principal reason for his
being in Florida.
A similar, but somewhat more restrictive proposal presented to the ABA
Subcommittee states in pertinent part that:
Section 213(d)(1) is amended to read as follows (with the added
portions [italicized] and deleted portions in brackets): (1) The term
"medical care" means amounts paid-(A) for the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease or for the purpose of
affecting any structure or function of the body. (B) for traveling ex-
penses (including amounts expended for meals and lodging for a minor
or incapacitated person plus one adult to whom such person is a depen-
dent as defined in Section 152, up to but not exceeding the United
States Government Employee per diem allowance for travel to and
at the location of medical care) while away from home [for transpor-
tation] primarily for and essential to medical care as defined in sub-
paragraph (A), provided that costs for meals and lodging shall be
allowed only if the medical care for the dependent requires actual
medical treatment which is: (i) conducted in a hospital or other medical
care delivery facility licensed by the Joint Commission for the Ac-
creditation of Hospitals; and(ii) by or under the direct supervision
of a licensed physician, at the place described in subparagraph (1)'5
This proposal (Proposal 2) includes the same per diem, location of treat-
ment, and nature of treatment limitations set out in the previously discussed
Proposal 1. Despite this similarity, however, the second proposal is less satisfac-
tory than is the first. Unlike Proposal 1, Proposal 2 would limit the class
of those who could deduct away-from-home outpatient living expenses under
section 213 to minors, incapacitated persons, and one accompanying adult
if that adult could claim the patient as a dependent under Code section 152. 15
No definition of "incapacitated" is provided. Moreover, the requirement that
154. See supra text accompanying note 151.
155. Letter from John A. Townsend to George Middleton, Jr., at 5 (May 3, 1983) (on file
in the Washington & Lee Law Review office).
156. See id.
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the accompanying adult be able to claim the away-from-home patient as a
dependent seemingly would prohibit spouses from deducting living costs in-
curred by them in accompanying their incapacitated spouses out of town." 7
This blanket prohibition would be ill-advised since, as in Kelly, ,58 the services
of a spouse may be necessary to the medical treatment and care of the away-
from-home patient.
Finally, using the dependency relationship between accompanying adults
and patients perhaps would result in easier administrative analysis of whether
the adult's presence was essential. Nonetheless, no guarantee exists that just
because the accompanying adult can claim the patient as a dependent, the
adult's presence is in any way necessary for the patient's care. The depen-
dency test alone, therefore, may lead to abusive deductions by accompanying
adults who travel not to provide medical care but to "get away from it all."
The requirement does not adequately address the relevant standard of medical
necessity.
The most recent Congressional proposal introduced in July 1983 (Pro-
posal 3), originated as H.R. 3593. It originally provided in pertinent part as
follows:
(2) Amounts Paid for Certain Lodging Away From Home Treated
as Paid for Medical Care.-Amounts paid for lodging (not lavish or
extravagant under the circumstances) while away from home primar-
ily for and essential to medical care referred to in paragraph (1)(A)
shall be treated as amounts paid for medical care if-(A) the medical
care referred to in paragraph (1)(A) is provided by a physician in-(i)
a licensed hospital, or(ii) a nationally or regionally recognized medical
care facility substantially all the services provided by which are medical
care services, and (B) there is no significant element of personal
pleasure, recreation, or vacation in the travel away from home."59
Proposal 3 had several advantages over the other proposals. The proposal
was not restricted in its application to minors and contained safeguards against
taxpayer abuse as strong as, if not stronger than, those requirements relating
to section 162 deductions. Deductible expenses could not be lavish, and had
to be incurred in connection with medical care received from a physician at
a hospital or other widely recognized facility. Moreover, no significant ele-
ment of personal pleasure or vacation could be present in the away-from-home
travel. While the proposed amendment said nothing about the expenses of
essential persons accompanying the out-of-town patient to provide medical
care, the sponsors of the bill intended:
that determinations about the deductibility of lodging for person[s] accompa-
157. See IRC § 152(a)(9) (West 1983).
158. See 440 F.2d at 308.
159. H.R. 3593, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 19, 1983) (styled the Stark-Conable bill after
its sponsors).
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nying the patient . . . be based on the standards applied under present law
for transportation.' 0
Some degree of substantiation also was contemplated.' 6' The principal
drawback of this proposal was that it limited deductibility to lodging expense
only, thereby retaining the present law with respect to nondeductibility of meal
expenses.
This bill ultimately emerged in modified form from committee as part
of the proposed Tax Reform Act of 1983, an omnibus bill proposed by the
Ways Means Committee at the end of the first session of the ninety-eighth
Congress. 2 The provisions were the same as the original version except that
a cap of fifty dollars per each eligible person per night was placed on the
amount of the deduction. However, a legislative impasse at the end of the
first session of the ninety-eighth Congress resulted in a House vote not to
take up the omnibus bill for consideration.'63 It is to be hoped that this bill
ultimately will meet with success in Congress, but with an allowance for deduc-
tion of meals and a higher cap on the amount of the deduction.
In conclusion, of the current proposals just discussed, ABA Proposal I
and H.R. 3593 as incorporated in H.R. 4170 provide the most satisfactory
responses to the current inequity under section 213. They would allow pa-
tients, whether or not minors or incapacitated, to deduct away-from-home
living costs incurred in connection with the receipt of essential medical care.
At the same time, they contain certain limitations that would insure that the
outpatient living costs are necessary and reasonable under the circumstances,
thereby going a long way toward precluding the abusive medical vacation deduc-
tions Congress intended to prohibit in 1954. Lastly, they recognize (explicitly
in the case of Proposal 1 and implicitly in the case of H.R. 3593 as incor-
porated in H.R. 4170), as does Code section 162 in an analogous area, 61 that
expenses incurred by an accompanying family member whose presence is essen-
tial also should be deductible.
Provisions such as these, if enacted, would go far toward correcting the
medical vacation abuse which seems to have been the principal reason for
denying deduction for meal and lodging expense in the first place. These pro-
visions, however, would not eliminate all abuses. The elimination of all tax-
payer abuse with respect to any provision in the tax law is virtually impossi-
ble. Nonetheless, in this situation, to settle for that which appears to be second-
best is appropriate in the absence of an optimal resolution. Since it is possible
to eliminate most abuse through a strict delineation of the circumstances in
160. See 129 CONG. REC. H5268 (July 19, 1983).
161. Id. "The IRS may require reasonable substantiation by taxpayers of the reasons for
and nature of the travel away from home, the medical care received and the activities undertaken
during the travel and treatment. It is expected that the nature of the substantiation required will
be reasonable in relation to the nature and size of the deductions involved." Id.
162. H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 491 (1983).
163. 129 CONtG. REC. H10223-H10236 (Nov. 17, 1983).
164. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(c); United States v. Disney, 413 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1969)
(business expense deduction permitted for spouse's attendance when bona fide business purpose).
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which the deduction will be allowable, and since circumstances clearly exist
in which the deduction is not only justifiable, but actually necessitated by sound
tax policy, to allow such a limited deduction is better than to allow none at
all.1
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